14.00-15.00: Crispin Wright: Can we understand a faultless disagreement? Hazlett A (2014) Legitimacy and mutually recognized reasonable disagreements. Episteme 1:1-25 15.00-16.00: Sebastiano Moruzzi: Diaphonic pluralism – How is one pluralistic about disagreements? Fundamental epistemic principles refer to our fundamental epidemic methods. These include “inferential methods such as deduction or induction and non-inferential methods, such as sensory perception” (Lynch 2010, p. 264. Kappel 2012, 10). These methods, in turn, are due to the fact that they cannot be proven to have a positive epistemic status without relying on the method in question. As many contemporary epismologists think, the ordinary belief in the world may be justified by sensory experience, but one cannot show that this practice of faith is reliable without using the method of shaping such beliefs on the basis of your sensory experiences. Footnote 20 Two remarks on this point. First, that is not a view I would like to attribute to Wittgenstein. This is a question of interpretation that is not within the scope of this document (although there are passages that indicate this point of view.
See Wittgenstein 1969, 310-316, 608-612). Second, I use the term “hinge engagement” instead of the hinge game, because the question of whether the sentences of the hinges are sentences is controversial. That is why I use the term “obligation” to remain neutral on this issue. You`ll find a preview under Pritchard (2011b). However, this type of explanation only helps to explain the persistence of indirect differences of opinion, in which the hinge obligations are not directly verified. The idea is that such disagreements are stubborn simply because what is really at issue is in the background, free from critical attention. However, in direct cases, this statement will not work, because what it is really about is being criticized by the opposing parties. In fact, Fogelin himself rejects this diagnosis of persistent profound disagreement.
For Fogelin, the source of such perseverance is not the fact that hinge bonds are in the background, but the fact that they are part of an “entire system” of sentences, even if they are put forward (Fogelin 2005, p. 9). The burden on the Wittgensteiner would then be to explain why this fact persists in the differences of opinion on the pivotal obligations, beyond the possible difficulty of evaluating “whole systems” of proposals. Lynch M (2016) After the digging rounds: disagreement, first principles and epistemic Contractarianism. Int J Study Skept 6:248-259 If Wittgenstein`s theory tells us that all deep disagreements are disagreements over hinge commitments, this raises the question of whether all differences of opinion on hinge commitments are profound disagreements. Footnote 12 One might think, for example, that disagreement over whether I have hands – a hinge obligation, according to Wittgenstein – is not quite a profound disagreement. At least it does not fit well with cases of paradigms of profound disagreement, such as the Young Earth Creationist case.